A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
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Publication:2976150
DOI10.1287/moor.2016.0802zbMath1360.91108OpenAlexW2538025225MaRDI QIDQ2976150
Publication date: 13 April 2017
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7b00475c189d2b197d84e7e01416846b525ffeed
Matroids in convex geometry (realizations in the context of convex polytopes, convexity in combinatorial structures, etc.) (52B40) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (8)
A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem ⋮ Finding a Stable Allocation in Polymatroid Intersection ⋮ Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints ⋮ Envy-free matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Popular matchings with two-sided preference lists and matroid constraints ⋮ Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy ⋮ Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints ⋮ Unnamed Item
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