Testable implications of the core in TU market games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.005zbMath1368.91013OpenAlexW2321232353MaRDI QIDQ298364

Yasushi Agatsuma

Publication date: 20 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

revealed preferencemarket gamescore rationalizationPareto rationalizationtestable implications

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items

A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference

Cites Work

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