The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.008zbMath1368.91076OpenAlexW3125752121MaRDI QIDQ298377

Leif Danziger, Ruth Ben-Yashar

Publication date: 20 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5859.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

extremely asymmetric committeesoptimal composition of committeesunanimity rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

• On the optimal composition of committees
• Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
• Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
• Judgment aggregation without full rationality
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• Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result