Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.003zbMath1368.91012OpenAlexW3121264659MaRDI QIDQ298378

Bo-Yu Zhang

Publication date: 20 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionquantal response equilibriumdominated strategynormal form gamesymmetric game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ On the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria and its application to network games

Uses Software

• Gambit

Cites Work

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