On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections
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Publication:2988834
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-55911-7_25zbMath1485.68109arXiv1701.05108OpenAlexW2581940583MaRDI QIDQ2988834
Jiehua Chen, Philipp Zschoche, Robert Bredereck, Leon Kellerhals, Viatcheslav Korenwein
Publication date: 19 May 2017
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.05108
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)
Related Items (3)
On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections ⋮ A parameterized perspective on protecting elections ⋮ Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
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