COALITION FORMATION WITH LEARNING FROM PREDECESSORS: A CASE OF DYNAMIC POSITIVE EXTERNALITY

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00352.XzbMath1210.91053OpenAlexW2047083210MaRDI QIDQ2994796

Ahmed Saber Mahmud

Publication date: 29 April 2011

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00352.x

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationdynamic externalitysequential move

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Networks of collaboration in oligopoly.
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division

This page was built for publication: COALITION FORMATION WITH LEARNING FROM PREDECESSORS: A CASE OF DYNAMIC POSITIVE EXTERNALITY