An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1100.1301zbMath1214.91023OpenAlexW2060170313MaRDI QIDQ3005706

Timothy N. Cason, Ralph Siebert, Karthik N. Kannan

Publication date: 9 June 2011

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1301

zbMATH Keywords

multistage gameprocurement auctioncomplete and incomplete information revelation policieslaboratory study

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities ⋮ Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions ⋮ Spite and reciprocity in auctions

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