Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy

DOI10.3982/TE567zbMath1229.91121OpenAlexW2126409736MaRDI QIDQ3006637

Hideo Konishi, Taiji Furusawa

Publication date: 20 June 2011

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te567

zbMATH Keywords

lobbyingpublic goodexternalitiesendogenous coalition formationcommon agency gamefree-ridersfree-riding-proof coreperfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation ⋮ Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms ⋮ A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good ⋮ Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance ⋮ Participation and demand levels for a joint project ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game ⋮ Group size paradox and public goods

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