Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory
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Publication:3006640
DOI10.3982/TE588zbMath1214.91041MaRDI QIDQ3006640
John E. Roemer, Fleurbaey, Marc
Publication date: 20 June 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Utility theory for games (91A30)
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