NON-COOPERATIVE AND AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE AVERAGE LEXICOGRAPHIC VALUE

DOI10.1142/S0219198910002751zbMath1229.91045OpenAlexW1966089436MaRDI QIDQ3011204

Yukihiko Funaki, Takumi Kongo, Rodica Branzei, S. H. Tijs

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002751

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameaverage consistencyaverage lexicographic value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems ⋮ Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games ⋮ Random reduction consistency of the Weber set, the core and the anti-core

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• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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