Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:301156
DOI10.1007/s10100-012-0271-6zbMath1339.91028OpenAlexW2020673206MaRDI QIDQ301156
Publication date: 29 June 2016
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-012-0271-6
game theoryreliability theoryutility theoryconflictattackdefenseColonel Blotto gamescontest success functionindividual protectionOR in militaryoverarching protectionterrorism
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