Measuring the power of soft correlated equilibrium in 2-facility simple non-increasing linear congestion games

DOI10.1007/s10100-012-0279-yzbMath1339.91026OpenAlexW1994347737MaRDI QIDQ301158

Ferenc Forgó

Publication date: 29 June 2016

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-012-0279-y

zbMATH Keywords

correlationcongestion gamesenforcement valuemediation value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games

Cites Work

• A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol
• Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess paradox
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• How bad is selfish routing?
• An O(n) algorithm for the multiple-choice knapsack linear program
• On the Value of Correlation
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung