College admissions with stable score-limits
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Publication:302118
DOI10.1007/s10100-013-0320-9zbMath1339.91082OpenAlexW2261176060MaRDI QIDQ302118
Publication date: 4 July 2016
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/33941/1/BK15cejor_last.pdf
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Cites Work
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- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Finding large stable matchings
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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