Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers

DOI10.1007/S10100-013-0319-2zbMath1339.91127OpenAlexW1854459797MaRDI QIDQ302124

Dániel Havran, Péter Csóka, Nóra Szűcs

Publication date: 4 July 2016

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1322.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymoral hazardtrade creditcorporate financing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Credit risk (91G40)

Related Items (3)

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing ⋮ The incentive model in supply chain with trade credit and default risk ⋮ Editorial

Cites Work

• Optimisation of short term commercial bank loans to corporates in terms of financing operating activities in Slovenia
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Bank Market Power and SME Financing Constraints*
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

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