The kernel is in the least core for permutation games

DOI10.1007/s10100-014-0342-yzbMath1339.91014OpenAlexW2043443830MaRDI QIDQ302128

Tamás Solymosi

Publication date: 4 July 2016

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1402.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

kernelleast corepermutation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Editorial

Cites Work

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• The reactive bargaining set for cooperative games
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• On Some Network Flow Games
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• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
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• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games

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