What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume’s Problem

DOI10.1080/02698595.2010.484544zbMath1229.03012OpenAlexW2061081254MaRDI QIDQ3021356

Daniel Steel

Publication date: 25 July 2011

Published in: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2010.484544

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (2)

No Answer to Hume ⋮ On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Testability and Ockham's razor: How formal and statistical learning theory converge in the new riddle of induction
• The logic of reliable and efficient inquiry
• Means-Ends Epistemology
• Would “Direct Realism” Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?

This page was built for publication: What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume’s Problem