Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship

DOI10.2307/2297567zbMath0625.90010OpenAlexW2049361995MaRDI QIDQ3028670

David Besanko, David P. Baron

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297567

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesscommitmentmultiperiod modelregulated firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (7)

Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing ⋮ Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task ⋮ Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Renegotiation design with multiple regulators ⋮ Optimal retention in agency problems ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

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