Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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Publication:3030609
DOI10.2307/1885060zbMath0626.90098OpenAlexW2109183455WikidataQ56503211 ScholiaQ56503211MaRDI QIDQ3030609
Publication date: 1987
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1885060
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