Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs

DOI10.2307/2526626zbMath0692.90012OpenAlexW2128814160MaRDI QIDQ3035084

Thomas R. Palfrey, Peter Cramton

Publication date: 1990

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-141652274

zbMATH Keywords

private informationBertrand competitioncartel agreementscommon cost uncertaintyprivate cost uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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