Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome

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Publication:3035088

DOI10.2307/2297543zbMath0692.90015OpenAlexW2271102491WikidataQ56852503 ScholiaQ56852503MaRDI QIDQ3035088

Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297543



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