Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3038980
DOI10.2307/1912115zbMath0525.90008OpenAlexW2030317052MaRDI QIDQ3038980
Theodore C. Bergstrom, Richard Cornes
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/54w6n69g
majority votingincome distributionLindahl equilibriumGroves-Clarke mechanism for preference revelationPareto optimal amount of public goods
Related Items (16)
The direct social preference relation in the theory of public expenditure ⋮ Share the gain, share the pain? Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions ⋮ The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers ⋮ Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply ⋮ Taxing pollution: agglomeration and welfare consequences ⋮ When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods? ⋮ Optimal climate policies in a dynamic multi-country equilibrium model ⋮ On strong independence of allocative efficiency from distribution in the theory of public goods ⋮ The overprovision anomaly of private public food supply ⋮ Testable implications of transferable utility ⋮ Intergenerational human capital evolution, local public good preferences, and stratification ⋮ Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models ⋮ Provision of public goods in a large economy ⋮ Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good ⋮ Welfarism in economic domains. ⋮ Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory
This page was built for publication: Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods
