Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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Publication:3040872
DOI10.2307/1911460zbMath0526.90012OpenAlexW2062139011MaRDI QIDQ3040872
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911460
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