Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
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Publication:3040873
DOI10.2307/1911462zbMath0526.90013OpenAlexW2168876164MaRDI QIDQ3040873
Robert H. Porter, Edward J. Green
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/83298/
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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