Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
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Publication:3044077
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00243zbMath1073.91020MaRDI QIDQ3044077
Publication date: 10 August 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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