Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

DOI10.3982/ECTA8354zbMath1203.91201MaRDI QIDQ3057835

Fuhito Kojima, Yeon-Koo Che

Publication date: 17 November 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic equivalenceprobabilistic serialrandom assignmentordinal efficiencyrandom priority mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)

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