Monotonicity and Implementability

DOI10.3982/ECTA8882zbMath1271.91070OpenAlexW2229124382WikidataQ62016800 ScholiaQ62016800MaRDI QIDQ3057838

Dov Monderer, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Itai Ashlagi

Publication date: 17 November 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8882

zbMATH Keywords

monotonedominant strategiescyclic monotonicityimplementable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Utility theory (91B16) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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