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Publication date: 8 December 2010

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

paradox consistency truth dialetheism liar sentence floating point revenge

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to mathematical logic and foundations (03-02)

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