A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification

DOI10.3982/TE632zbMath1210.91015OpenAlexW3121224226MaRDI QIDQ3061200

Publication date: 14 December 2010

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te632

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games stochastic games strong stability Markov perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamic games (91A25)

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