Effects of law-enforcement efficiency and duration of trials in an oligopolistic competition among fair and unfair firms
DOI10.1007/S10957-016-0866-5zbMath1346.49062DBLPjournals/jota/BramatiPR16OpenAlexW2233179035WikidataQ63379520 ScholiaQ63379520MaRDI QIDQ306411
Arsen Palestini, Maria Caterina Bramati, Mauro Rota
Publication date: 31 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-016-0866-5
Differential games and control (49N70) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- R\&D incentives and market structure: dynamic analysis
- Analysis of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws
- From mind to market: a global, dynamic analysis of R\&D
- Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation
- Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting
- Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics
- A Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-Bodied Commercial Aircraft
This page was built for publication: Effects of law-enforcement efficiency and duration of trials in an oligopolistic competition among fair and unfair firms
