Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
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Publication:306741
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.05.001zbMath1368.91018OpenAlexW2361205967MaRDI QIDQ306741
Publication date: 1 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.05.001
Related Items (3)
Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ Unnamed Item
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