Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.04.004zbMath1368.91038OpenAlexW3123968684MaRDI QIDQ306742

F. Blanchet-Sadri, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 1 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitygames with incomplete informationanalogy-based expectation equilibriumBayesian Nash equilibriumcoarse reasoningpartial signal-awareness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Information acquisition in the era of fair disclosure: an application of asymmetric awareness

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