False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3068942
DOI10.1613/jair.3166zbMath1210.91011arXiv1401.3869OpenAlexW3100107980MaRDI QIDQ3068942
Haris Aziz, Edith Elkind, Yoram Bachrach, Mike S. Paterson
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3869
NP-hardweighted voting gamesagentsdecision-makingShapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf indexAnnexation Non-monotonicity Paradox
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)
Related Items (13)
Proof systems and transformation games ⋮ Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota ⋮ Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games ⋮ Manipulation in communication structures of graph-restricted weighted voting games ⋮ The consequences of eliminating NP solutions ⋮ Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights ⋮ Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control ⋮ Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation ⋮ Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model ⋮ Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning ⋮ Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights ⋮ Structural control in weighted voting games
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
