Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model

DOI10.3982/ECTA8025zbMath1204.91057OpenAlexW1488995906MaRDI QIDQ3069948

Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 2 February 2011

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8025

zbMATH Keywords

auctions adverse selection mechanism design independent private values bilateral trade incentive compatibility dominant-strategy implementation Bayesian implementations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (26)

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