Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
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Publication:3081384
DOI10.3982/TE816zbMath1231.91360OpenAlexW3095800867MaRDI QIDQ3081384
Jay Sethuraman, Parag A. Pathak
Publication date: 8 March 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te816
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