Protecting complex infrastructures against multiple strategic attackers

DOI10.1080/00207720903434789zbMath1207.91055OpenAlexW2160006859MaRDI QIDQ3082642

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 16 March 2011

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207720903434789

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryreliability theoryutility theoryconflictprotectionattackcontest success functionOR in militaryterrorismparallel systemseries systemwarinterdependent systemsdefenceindependent systemscomplex infrastructuresinterlinked systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (11)

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-PERIOD-DEPENDENT DEGRADED MULTISTATE RELIABILITY SYSTEMS ⋮ Individual versus overarching protection and attack of assets ⋮ A two-stage resource allocation model for lifeline systems quick response with vulnerability analysis ⋮ Evolving optimised decision rules for intrusion detection using particle swarm paradigm ⋮ A mathematical framework to optimize resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure systems under spatially localized attacks ⋮ Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy -- a discrete simultaneous game ⋮ COMBINED SERIES AND PARALLEL SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO INDIVIDUAL VERSUS OVERARCHING DEFENSE AND ATTACK ⋮ The uncertainty recovery analysis for interdependent infrastructure systems using the dynamic inoperability input–output model ⋮ Solving a bi-objective unmanned aircraft system location-allocation problem ⋮ Adaptive event-triggered mechanism for networked control systems under deception attacks with uncertain occurring probability ⋮ Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces

Cites Work

• Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems
• False targets efficiency in defense strategy
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Interdependent security
• Optimal allocation of multi-state elements in linear consecutively connected systems with vulnerable nodes.
• Contest success functions
• Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems
• Sequential Equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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