Signaling Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_8zbMath1318.91035OpenAlexW4246255371MaRDI QIDQ3082845

Kevin J. S. Zollman, Simon M. Huttegger

Publication date: 17 March 2011

Published in: Language, Games, and Evolution (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18006-4_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Linguistics (91F20)

Related Items

Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games ⋮ Learning with neighbours ⋮ The evolution of compositionality in signaling games ⋮ The evolution of vagueness ⋮ Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests ⋮ David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning ⋮ Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages ⋮ The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games

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