Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
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Publication:308603
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003zbMath1371.91131OpenAlexW2341098338MaRDI QIDQ308603
Satoru Fujishige, Bo Chen, Zaifu Yang
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/99299/1/CFY_Jet_Publication_Version_2016.pdf
Related Items
Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Analysis of stochastic matching markets, Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies, Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem, Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games, Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching, Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty, Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration, The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games, Paths to stable allocations, Local stability constraints, Hesitant fuzzy linguistic two-sided matching decision making
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