Responsive affirmative action in school choice
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Publication:308606
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.04.007zbMath1371.91133OpenAlexW3122806528MaRDI QIDQ308606
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.007
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (16)
When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? ⋮ Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves ⋮ Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based ⋮ Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice ⋮ On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case ⋮ Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study ⋮ On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution ⋮ A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
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