Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.04.012zbMath1371.91116OpenAlexW2342544874MaRDI QIDQ308625

Sophie Bade

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.012

zbMATH Keywords

random serial dictatorshipgroup-strategyproofnon-bossyrandom matching mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects ⋮ Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• Non-bossiness
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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