How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.05.001zbMath1371.91014OpenAlexW3122305169MaRDI QIDQ308633

Satoru Takahashi, Johannes Hörner

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2029.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rates of convergencerepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ On the value of repetition for communication games

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