Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
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Publication:308649
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002zbMath1371.91054OpenAlexW2434623774MaRDI QIDQ308649
Publication date: 6 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002
complete informationimplementationbounded depths of rationalitycommon knowledge of rationalitymutual knowledge of rationality
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