Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

DOI10.1080/10236190903200677zbMath1219.91011OpenAlexW1997926674MaRDI QIDQ3090077

Fernanda A. Ferreira, M. Álvarez-Mozos, Alberto A. Pinto, José M. Alonso-Meijide

Publication date: 26 August 2011

Published in: Journal of Difference Equations and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6687

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamespower indicesdecision-making processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (4)

A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices ⋮ Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions ⋮ Evaluation of decision power in multi-dimensional rules ⋮ Public good indices for games with several levels of approval

Cites Work

• Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations

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