Secure Two-Party Computation over a Z-Channel

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_3zbMath1298.94101OpenAlexW1661937551MaRDI QIDQ3092345

Olivier Pereira, Paolo Palmieri

Publication date: 16 September 2011

Published in: Provable Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/22160/1/Palmieri_Pereira_PROVSEC2011.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

secure multi-party computationinformation theoretic securityOblivious transfercryptography on noisy channels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• Building Oblivious Transfer on Channel Delays
• On the Oblivious-Transfer Capacity of Noisy Resources
• Oblivious Transfer from Weak Noisy Channels
• The limiting behavior of the Z-channel (Corresp.)
• On the (Im)possibility of Basing Oblivious Transfer and Bit Commitment on Weakened Security Assumptions
• An analysis of the timed Z-channel
• Oblivious-Transfer Amplification
• Security in Communication Networks
• Theory of Cryptography

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