Taxonomical Security Consideration of Authenticated Key Exchange Resilient to Intermediate Computation Leakage

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_25zbMath1298.94113OpenAlexW54446400MaRDI QIDQ3092372

Yunlei Zhao, Kazuki Yoneyama

Publication date: 16 September 2011

Published in: Provable Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_25

zbMATH Keywords

Diffie-Hellmanauthenticated key exchangeintermediate computation leakageseCK model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (1)

FORSAKES: a forward-secure authenticated key exchange protocol based on symmetric key-evolving schemes

Uses Software

• HMQV
• NAXOS

Cites Work

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• Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
• An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement
• Security Proofs for Signature Schemes
• A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie–Hellman Protocol
• Designing Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Resilient to Leakage of Ephemeral Secret Keys
• Authenticated Key Exchange and Key Encapsulation in the Standard Model
• Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange
• A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement
• An eCK-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol without Random Oracles
• Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman Protocols
• HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol
• Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2006

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