Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
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Publication:3093628
DOI10.1137/080744992zbMath1234.68460OpenAlexW2057087699MaRDI QIDQ3093628
Tim Roughgarden, Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi
Publication date: 18 October 2011
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/080744992
Game theory (91A99) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Randomized algorithms (68W20)
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