Taking Mistakes Seriously: Equivalence Notions for Game Scenarios with off Equilibrium Play

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_8zbMath1298.91036OpenAlexW1555550596MaRDI QIDQ3094000

Alistair Isaac, Tomohiro Hoshi

Publication date: 19 October 2011

Published in: Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (1)

Logical Player Types for a Theory of Play

Cites Work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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