First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now prices with Allais paradox bidders

DOI10.3982/TE502zbMath1278.91080OpenAlexW2123865781MaRDI QIDQ3095017

Daisuke Nakajima

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te502

zbMATH Keywords

Allais paradoxDutch auctionsbuy-it-now pricesdescending auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation ⋮ The two faces of independence: betweenness and homotheticity ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity ⋮ Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions ⋮ On the consensus effect ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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