The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.04.005zbMath1397.91474OpenAlexW2345739716WikidataQ125026638 ScholiaQ125026638MaRDI QIDQ309845

Mohammad Hasan, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 7 September 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

blocking lemmagroup incentive compatibilitymatching markets with contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Voting by Committees
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings