Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model

DOI10.1002/oca.966zbMath1237.91152OpenAlexW2027758841MaRDI QIDQ3098480

Marco Guerrazzi

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Optimal Control Applications and Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/oca.966

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlwage bargainingnumerical solutionsright-to-manage model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90)

Related Items

The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts ⋮ Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

Cites Work

• Bargaining with an agenda
• The Bargaining Problem
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
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