scientific article

Publication date: 24 November 2011

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

linear programming social choice theory mechanism design incentive systems

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Linear programming (90C05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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